* nomad/structs/csi: split CanWrite into health, in use
* scheduler/scheduler: expose AllocByID in the state interface
* nomad/state/state_store_test
* scheduler/stack: SetJobID on the matcher
* scheduler/feasible: when a volume writer is in use, check if it's us
* scheduler/feasible: remove SetJob
* nomad/state/state_store: denormalize allocs before Claim
* nomad/structs/csi: return errors on claim, with context
* nomad/csi_endpoint_test: new alloc doesn't look like an update
* nomad/state/state_store_test: change test reference to CanWrite
* nomad/state/schema: use the namespace compound index
* scheduler/scheduler: CSIVolumeByID interface signature namespace
* scheduler/stack: SetJob on CSIVolumeChecker to capture namespace
* scheduler/feasible: pass the captured namespace to CSIVolumeByID
* nomad/state/state_store: use namespace in csi_volume index
* nomad/fsm: pass namespace to CSIVolumeDeregister & Claim
* nomad/core_sched: pass the namespace in volumeClaimReap
* nomad/node_endpoint_test: namespaces in Claim testing
* nomad/csi_endpoint: pass RequestNamespace to state.*
* nomad/csi_endpoint_test: appropriately failed test
* command/alloc_status_test: appropriately failed test
* node_endpoint_test: avoid notTheNamespace for the job
* scheduler/feasible_test: call SetJob to capture the namespace
* nomad/csi_endpoint: ACL check the req namespace, query by namespace
* nomad/state/state_store: remove deregister namespace check
* nomad/state/state_store: remove unused CSIVolumes
* scheduler/feasible: CSIVolumeChecker SetJob -> SetNamespace
* nomad/csi_endpoint: ACL check
* nomad/state/state_store_test: remove call to state.CSIVolumes
* nomad/core_sched_test: job namespace match so claim gc works
Previously we were looking up plugins based on the Alias Name for a CSI
Volume within the context of its task group.
Here we first look up a volume based on its identifier and then validate
the existence of the plugin based on its `PluginID`.
This commit filters the jobs volumes when setting them on the
feasibility checker. This ensures that the rest of the checker does not
have to worry about non-csi volumes.
* state_store: csi volumes/plugins store the index in the txn
* nomad: csi_endpoint_test require index checks need uint64()
* nomad: other tests using int 0 not uint64(0)
* structs: pass index into New, but not other struct methods
* state_store: csi plugin indexes, use new struct interface
* nomad: csi_endpoint_test check index/query meta (on explicit 0)
* structs: NewCSIVolume takes an index arg now
* scheduler/test: NewCSIVolume takes an index arg now
diffSystemAllocs -> diffSystemAllocsForNode, this function is only used
for diffing system allocations, but lacked awareness of eligible
nodes and the node ID that the allocation was going to be placed.
This change now ignores a change if its existing allocation is on an
ineligible node. For a new allocation, it also checks tainted and
ineligible nodes in the same function instead of nil-ing out the diff
after computation in diffSystemAllocs
If an existing system allocation is running and the node its running on
is marked as ineligible, subsequent plan/applys return an RPC error
instead of a more helpful plan result.
This change logs the error, and appends a failedTGAlloc for the
placement.
If an alloc is being preempted and marked as evict, but the underlying
node is lost before the migration takes place, the allocation currently
stays as desired evict, status running forever, or until the node comes
back online.
This commit updates updateNonTerminalAllocsToLost to check for a
destired status of Evict as well as Stop when updating allocations on
tainted nodes.
switch to table test for lost node cases
We currently log an error if preemption is unable to find a suitable set of
allocations to preempt. This commit changes that to debug level since not finding
preemptable allocations is not an error condition.
Fixes#5856
When the scheduler looks for a placement for an allocation that's
replacing another allocation, it's supposed to penalize the previous
node if the allocation had been rescheduled or failed. But we're
currently always penalizing the node, which leads to unnecessary
migrations on job update.
This commit leaves in place the existing behavior where if the
previous alloc was itself rescheduled, its previous nodes are also
penalized. This is conservative but the right behavior especially on
larger clusters where a group of hosts might be having correlated
trouble (like an AZ failure).
Co-Authored-By: Michael Schurter <mschurter@hashicorp.com>
Fixes#6787
In ProposedAllocs the proposed alloc slice was being copied while its
contents were not. Since RemoveAllocs nils elements of the proposed
alloc slice and is called twice, it could panic on the second call when
erroneously accessing a nil'd alloc.
The fix is to not copy the proposed alloc slice and pass the slice
returned by the 1st RemoveAllocs call to the 2nd call, thus maintaining
the trimmed length.
The existing version constraint uses logic optimized for package
managers, not schedulers, when checking prereleases:
- 1.3.0-beta1 will *not* satisfy ">= 0.6.1"
- 1.7.0-rc1 will *not* satisfy ">= 1.6.0-beta1"
This is due to package managers wishing to favor final releases over
prereleases.
In a scheduler versions more often represent the earliest release all
required features/APIs are available in a system. Whether the constraint
or the version being evaluated are prereleases has no impact on
ordering.
This commit adds a new constraint - `semver` - which will use Semver
v2.0 ordering when evaluating constraints. Given the above examples:
- 1.3.0-beta1 satisfies ">= 0.6.1" using `semver`
- 1.7.0-rc1 satisfies ">= 1.6.0-beta1" using `semver`
Since existing jobspecs may rely on the old behavior, a new constraint
was added and the implicit Consul Connect and Vault constraints were
updated to use it.
Fixes documentation inaccuracy for spread stanza placement. Spreads can
only exist on the top level job struct or within a group.
comment about nil assumption
Adds checks for affinity and constraint changes when determining if we
should update inplace.
refactor to check all levels at once
check for spread changes when checking inplace update
Currently, using a Volume in a job uses the following configuration:
```
volume "alias-name" {
type = "volume-type"
read_only = true
config {
source = "host_volume_name"
}
}
```
This commit migrates to the following:
```
volume "alias-name" {
type = "volume-type"
source = "host_volume_name"
read_only = true
}
```
The original design was based due to being uncertain about the future of storage
plugins, and to allow maxium flexibility.
However, this causes a few issues, namely:
- We frequently need to parse this configuration during submission,
scheduling, and mounting
- It complicates the configuration from and end users perspective
- It complicates the ability to do validation
As we understand the problem space of CSI a little more, it has become
clear that we won't need the `source` to be in config, as it will be
used in the majority of cases:
- Host Volumes: Always need a source
- Preallocated CSI Volumes: Always needs a source from a volume or claim name
- Dynamic Persistent CSI Volumes*: Always needs a source to attach the volumes
to for managing upgrades and to avoid dangling.
- Dynamic Ephemeral CSI Volumes*: Less thought out, but `source` will probably point
to the plugin name, and a `config` block will
allow you to pass meta to the plugin. Or will
point to a pre-configured ephemeral config.
*If implemented
The new design simplifies this by merging the source into the volume
stanza to solve the above issues with usability, performance, and error
handling.
When checking driver feasability for an alloc with multiple drivers, we
must check that all drivers are detected and healthy.
Nomad 0.9 and 0.8 have a bug where we may check a single driver only,
but which driver is dependent on map traversal order, which is
unspecified in golang spec.
When a Client declares a volume is ReadOnly, we should only schedule it
for requests for ReadOnly volumes. This change means that if a host
exposes a readonly volume, we then validate that the group level
requests for the volume are all read only for that host.
