On Windows, Nomad uses `syscall.NewLazyDLL` and `syscall.LoadDLL` functions to
load a few system DLL files, which does not prevent DLL hijacking
attacks. Hypothetically a local attacker on the client host that can place an
abusive library in a specific location could use this to escalate privileges to
the Nomad process. Although this attack does not fall within the Nomad security
model, it doesn't hurt to follow good practices here.
We can remove two of these DLL loads by using wrapper functions provided by the
stdlib in `x/sys/windows`
Co-authored-by: dduzgun-security <deniz.duzgun@hashicorp.com>
* command/agent/host: collect host data, multi platform
* nomad/structs/structs: new HostDataRequest/Response
* client/agent_endpoint: add RPC endpoint
* command/agent/agent_endpoint: add Host
* api/agent: add the Host endpoint
* nomad/client_agent_endpoint: add Agent Host with forwarding
* nomad/client_agent_endpoint: use findClientConn
This changes forwardMonitorClient and forwardProfileClient to use
findClientConn, which was cribbed from the common parts of those
funcs.
* command/debug: call agent hosts
* command/agent/host: eliminate calling external programs
