Every now and then TestExecutor_OOMKilled would fail with: "unable to start
container process: container init was OOM-killed (memory limit too low?)" which
started happening since we upgraded libcontainer.
This PR removes manual (and arbitrary) resource limits on the test
task, since it should be OOMd with resources inherited from the
testExecutorCommandWithChroot, and it fixes a small possible goroutine leak in
the OOM checker in exec driver.
On supported platforms, the secrets directory is a 1MiB tmpfs. But some tasks
need larger space for downloading large secrets. This is especially the case for
tasks using `templates`, which need extra room to write a temporary file to the
secrets directory that gets renamed to the old file atomically.
This changeset allows increasing the size of the tmpfs in the `resources`
block. Because this is a memory resource, we need to include it in the memory we
allocate for scheduling purposes. The task is already prevented from using more
memory in the tmpfs than the `resources.memory` field allows, but can bypass
that limit by writing to the tmpfs via `template` or `artifact` blocks.
Therefore, we need to account for the size of the tmpfs in the allocation
resources. Simply adding it to the memory needed when we create the allocation
allows it to be accounted for in all downstream consumers, and then we'll
subtract that amount from the memory resources just before configuring the task
driver.
For backwards compatibility, the default value of 1MiB is "free" and ignored by
the scheduler. Otherwise we'd be increasing the allocated resources for every
existing alloc, which could cause problems across upgrades. If a user explicitly
sets `resources.secrets = 1` it will no longer be free.
Fixes: https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues/2481
Ref: https://hashicorp.atlassian.net/browse/NET-10070
Whenever the "exec" task driver is being used, nomad runs a plug in that in time runs the task on a container under the hood. If by any circumstance the executor is killed, the task is reparented to the init service and wont be stopped by Nomad in case of a job updated or stop.
This commit introduces two mechanisms to avoid this behaviour:
* Adds signal catching and handling to the executor, so in case of a SIGTERM, the signal will also be passed on to the task.
* Adds a pre start clean up of the processes in the container, ensuring only the ones the executor runs are present at any given time.
* drivers/raw_exec: enable setting cgroup override values
This PR enables configuration of cgroup override values on the `raw_exec`
task driver. WARNING: setting cgroup override values eliminates any
gauruntee Nomad can make about resource availability for *any* task on
the client node.
For cgroup v2 systems, set a single unified cgroup path using `cgroup_v2_override`.
The path may be either absolute or relative to the cgroup root.
config {
cgroup_v2_override = "custom.slice/app.scope"
}
or
config {
cgroup_v2_override = "/sys/fs/cgroup/custom.slice/app.scope"
}
For cgroup v1 systems, set a per-controller path for each controller using
`cgroup_v1_override`. The path(s) may be either absolute or relative to
the controller root.
config {
cgroup_v1_override = {
"pids": "custom/app",
"cpuset": "custom/app",
}
}
or
config {
cgroup_v1_override = {
"pids": "/sys/fs/cgroup/pids/custom/app",
"cpuset": "/sys/fs/cgroup/cpuset/custom/app",
}
}
* drivers/rawexec: ensure only one of v1/v2 cgroup override is set
* drivers/raw_exec: executor should error if setting cgroup does not work
* drivers/raw_exec: create cgroups in raw_exec tests
* drivers/raw_exec: ensure we fail to start if custom cgroup set and non-root
* move custom cgroup func into shared file
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Schurter <mschurter@hashicorp.com>
* exec2: add client support for unveil filesystem isolation mode
This PR adds support for a new filesystem isolation mode, "Unveil". The
mode introduces a "alloc_mounts" directory where tasks have user-owned
directory structure which are bind mounts into the real alloc directory
structure. This enables a task driver to use landlock (and maybe the
real unveil on openbsd one day) to isolate a task to the task owned
directory structure, providing sandboxing.
* actually create alloc-mounts-dir directory
* fix doc strings about alloc mount dir paths
* Add OomKilled field to executor proto format
* Teach linux executor to detect and report OOMs
* Teach exec driver to propagate OOMKill information
* Fix data race
* use tail /dev/zero to create oom condition
* use new test framework
* minor tweaks to executor test
* add cl entry
* remove type conversion
---------
Co-authored-by: Marvin Chin <marvinchin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Seth Hoenig <shoenig@duck.com>
* drivers: plumb hardware topology via grpc into drivers
This PR swaps out the temporary use of detecting system hardware manually
in each driver for using the Client's detected topology by plumbing the
data over gRPC. This ensures that Client configuration is taken to account
consistently in all references to system topology.
* cr: use enum instead of bool for core grade
* cr: fix test slit tables to be possible
* client: refactor cpuset partitioning
This PR updates the way Nomad client manages the split between tasks
that make use of resources.cpus vs. resources.cores.
Previously, each task was explicitly assigned which CPU cores they were
able to run on. Every time a task was started or destroyed, all other
tasks' cpusets would need to be updated. This was inefficient and would
crush the Linux kernel when a client would try to run ~400 or so tasks.
Now, we make use of cgroup heirarchy and cpuset inheritence to efficiently
manage cpusets.
* cr: tweaks for feedback
Before this commit, it was only used for fingerprinting, but not
for CPU stats on nodes or tasks. This meant that if the
auto-detection failed, setting the cpu_total_compute didn't resolved
the issue.
This issue was most noticeable on ARM64, as there auto-detection
always failed.
This complements the `env` parameter, so that the operator can author
tasks that don't share their Vault token with the workload when using
`image` filesystem isolation. As a result, more powerful tokens can be used
in a job definition, allowing it to use template stanzas to issue all kinds of
secrets (database secrets, Vault tokens with very specific policies, etc.),
without sharing that issuing power with the task itself.
This is accomplished by creating a directory called `private` within
the task's working directory, which shares many properties of
the `secrets` directory (tmpfs where possible, not accessible by
`nomad alloc fs` or Nomad's web UI), but isn't mounted into/bound to the
container.
If the `disable_file` parameter is set to `false` (its default), the Vault token
is also written to the NOMAD_SECRETS_DIR, so the default behavior is
backwards compatible. Even if the operator never changes the default,
they will still benefit from the improved behavior of Nomad never reading
the token back in from that - potentially altered - location.
Currently, the `exec` driver is only setting the Bounding set, which is
not sufficient to actually enable the requisite capabilities for the
task process. In order for the capabilities to survive `execve`
performed by libcontainer, the `Permitted`, `Inheritable`, and `Ambient`
sets must also be set.
Per CAPABILITIES (7):
> Ambient: This is a set of capabilities that are preserved across an
> execve(2) of a program that is not privileged. The ambient capability
> set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be ambient if it
> is not both permitted and inheritable.
* Update ioutil library references to os and io respectively for drivers package
No user facing changes so I assume no change log is required
* Fix failing tests
The exec driver and other drivers derived from the shared executor check the
path of the command before handing off to libcontainer to ensure that the
command doesn't escape the sandbox. But we don't check any host volume mounts,
which should be safe to use as a source for executables if we're letting the
user mount them to the container in the first place.
Check the mount config to verify the executable lives in the mount's host path,
but then return an absolute path within the mount's task path so that we can hand
that off to libcontainer to run.
Includes a good bit of refactoring here because the anchoring of the final task
path has different code paths for inside the task dir vs inside a mount. But
I've fleshed out the test coverage of this a good bit to ensure we haven't
created any regressions in the process.
* test: use `T.TempDir` to create temporary test directory
This commit replaces `ioutil.TempDir` with `t.TempDir` in tests. The
directory created by `t.TempDir` is automatically removed when the test
and all its subtests complete.
Prior to this commit, temporary directory created using `ioutil.TempDir`
needs to be removed manually by calling `os.RemoveAll`, which is omitted
in some tests. The error handling boilerplate e.g.
defer func() {
if err := os.RemoveAll(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
is also tedious, but `t.TempDir` handles this for us nicely.
Reference: https://pkg.go.dev/testing#T.TempDir
Signed-off-by: Eng Zer Jun <engzerjun@gmail.com>
* test: fix TestLogmon_Start_restart on Windows
Signed-off-by: Eng Zer Jun <engzerjun@gmail.com>
* test: fix failing TestConsul_Integration
t.TempDir fails to perform the cleanup properly because the folder is
still in use
testing.go:967: TempDir RemoveAll cleanup: unlinkat /tmp/TestConsul_Integration2837567823/002/191a6f1a-5371-cf7c-da38-220fe85d10e5/web/secrets: device or resource busy
Signed-off-by: Eng Zer Jun <engzerjun@gmail.com>
This PR introduces support for using Nomad on systems with cgroups v2 [1]
enabled as the cgroups controller mounted on /sys/fs/cgroups. Newer Linux
distros like Ubuntu 21.10 are shipping with cgroups v2 only, causing problems
for Nomad users.
Nomad mostly "just works" with cgroups v2 due to the indirection via libcontainer,
but not so for managing cpuset cgroups. Before, Nomad has been making use of
a feature in v1 where a PID could be a member of more than one cgroup. In v2
this is no longer possible, and so the logic around computing cpuset values
must be modified. When Nomad detects v2, it manages cpuset values in-process,
rather than making use of cgroup heirarchy inheritence via shared/reserved
parents.
Nomad will only activate the v2 logic when it detects cgroups2 is mounted at
/sys/fs/cgroups. This means on systems running in hybrid mode with cgroups2
mounted at /sys/fs/cgroups/unified (as is typical) Nomad will continue to
use the v1 logic, and should operate as before. Systems that do not support
cgroups v2 are also not affected.
When v2 is activated, Nomad will create a parent called nomad.slice (unless
otherwise configured in Client conifg), and create cgroups for tasks using
naming convention <allocID>-<task>.scope. These follow the naming convention
set by systemd and also used by Docker when cgroups v2 is detected.
Client nodes now export a new fingerprint attribute, unique.cgroups.version
which will be set to 'v1' or 'v2' to indicate the cgroups regime in use by
Nomad.
The new cpuset management strategy fixes#11705, where docker tasks that
spawned processes on startup would "leak". In cgroups v2, the PIDs are
started in the cgroup they will always live in, and thus the cause of
the leak is eliminated.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.htmlCloses#11289Fixes#11705#11773#11933
Fixes#2522
Skip embedding client.alloc_dir when building chroot. If a user
configures a Nomad client agent so that the chroot_env will embed the
client.alloc_dir, Nomad will happily infinitely recurse while building
the chroot until something horrible happens. The best case scenario is
the filesystem's path length limit is hit. The worst case scenario is
disk space is exhausted.
A bad agent configuration will look something like this:
```hcl
data_dir = "/tmp/nomad-badagent"
client {
enabled = true
chroot_env {
# Note that the source matches the data_dir
"/tmp/nomad-badagent" = "/ohno"
# ...
}
}
```
Note that `/ohno/client` (the state_dir) will still be created but not
`/ohno/alloc` (the alloc_dir).
While I cannot think of a good reason why someone would want to embed
Nomad's client (and possibly server) directories in chroots, there
should be no cause for harm. chroots are only built when Nomad runs as
root, and Nomad disables running exec jobs as root by default. Therefore
even if client state is copied into chroots, it will be inaccessible to
tasks.
Skipping the `data_dir` and `{client,server}.state_dir` is possible, but
this PR attempts to implement the minimum viable solution to reduce risk
of unintended side effects or bugs.
When running tests as root in a vm without the fix, the following error
occurs:
```
=== RUN TestAllocDir_SkipAllocDir
alloc_dir_test.go:520:
Error Trace: alloc_dir_test.go:520
Error: Received unexpected error:
Couldn't create destination file /tmp/TestAllocDir_SkipAllocDir1457747331/001/nomad/test/testtask/nomad/test/testtask/.../nomad/test/testtask/secrets/.nomad-mount: open /tmp/TestAllocDir_SkipAllocDir1457747331/001/nomad/test/.../testtask/secrets/.nomad-mount: file name too long
Test: TestAllocDir_SkipAllocDir
--- FAIL: TestAllocDir_SkipAllocDir (22.76s)
```
Also removed unused Copy methods on AllocDir and TaskDir structs.
Thanks to @eveld for not letting me forget about this!
Explicitly set the `oom_score_adj` value for `exec` and `java` tasks.
We recommend that the Nomad service to have oom_score_adj of a low value
(e.g. -1000) to avoid having nomad agent OOM Killed if the node is
oversubscriped.
However, Nomad's workloads should not inherit Nomad's process, which is
the default behavior.
Fixes#10663
This PR enables setting allow_caps on the exec driver
plugin configuration, as well as cap_add and cap_drop in
exec task configuration. These options replicate the
functionality already present in the docker task driver.
Important: this change also reduces the default set of
capabilities enabled by the exec driver to match the
default set enabled by the docker driver. Until v1.0.5
the exec task driver would enable all capabilities supported
by the operating system. v1.0.5 removed NET_RAW from that
list of default capabilities, but left may others which
could potentially also be leveraged by compromised tasks.
Important: the "root" user is still special cased when
used with the exec driver. Older versions of Nomad enabled
enabled all capabilities supported by the operating system
for tasks set with the root user. To maintain compatibility
with existing clusters we continue supporting this "feature",
however we maintain support for the legacy set of capabilities
rather than enabling all capabilities now supported on modern
operating systems.
The default Linux Capabilities set enabled by the docker, exec, and
java task drivers includes CAP_NET_RAW (for making ping just work),
which has the side affect of opening an ARP DoS/MiTM attack between
tasks using bridge networking on the same host network.
https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/run/#runtime-privilege-and-linux-capabilities
This PR disables CAP_NET_RAW for the docker, exec, and java task
drivers. The previous behavior can be restored for docker using the
allow_caps docker plugin configuration option.
A future version of nomad will enable similar configurability for the
exec and java task drivers.
* Fixup uses of `sanity`
* Remove unnecessary comments.
These checks are better explained by earlier comments about
the context of the test. Per @tgross, moved the tests together
to better reinforce the overall shared context.
* Update nomad/fsm_test.go
This PR adds pid_mode and ipc_mode options to the exec and java task
driver config options. By default these will defer to the default_pid_mode
and default_ipc_mode agent plugin options created in #9969. Setting
these values to "host" mode disables isolation for the task. Doing so
is not recommended, but may be necessary to support legacy job configurations.
Closes#9970
This PR adds default_pid_mode and default_ipc_mode options to the exec and java
task drivers. By default these will default to "private" mode, enabling PID and
IPC isolation for tasks. Setting them to "host" mode disables isolation. Doing
so is not recommended, but may be necessary to support legacy job configurations.
Closes#9969
When raw_exec is configured with [`no_cgroups`](https://www.nomadproject.io/docs/drivers/raw_exec#no_cgroups), raw_exec shouldn't attempt to create a cgroup.
Prior to this change, we accidentally always required freezer cgroup to do stats PID tracking. We already have the proper fallback in place for metrics, so only need to ensure that we don't create a cgroup for the task.
Fixes https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues/8565
My latest Vagrant box contains an empty cgroup name that isn't used for
isolation:
```
$ cat /proc/self/cgroup | grep ::
0::/user.slice/user-1000.slice/session-17.scope
```
This commit introduces support for configuring mount propagation when
mounting volumes with the `volume_mount` stanza on Linux targets.
Similar to Kubernetes, we expose 3 options for configuring mount
propagation:
- private, which is equivalent to `rprivate` on Linux, which does not allow the
container to see any new nested mounts after the chroot was created.
- host-to-task, which is equivalent to `rslave` on Linux, which allows new mounts
that have been created _outside of the container_ to be visible
inside the container after the chroot is created.
- bidirectional, which is equivalent to `rshared` on Linux, which allows both
the container to see new mounts created on the host, but
importantly _allows the container to create mounts that are
visible in other containers an don the host_
private and host-to-task are safe, but bidirectional mounts can be
dangerous, as if the code inside a container creates a mount, and does
not clean it up before tearing down the container, it can cause bad
things to happen inside the kernel.
To add a layer of safety here, we require that the user has ReadWrite
permissions on the volume before allowing bidirectional mounts, as a
defense in depth / validation case, although creating mounts should also require
a priviliged execution environment inside the container.
