Files
nomad/client/allocrunner/taskrunner/template/template_windows.go
Tim Gross df86503349 template: sandbox template rendering
The Nomad client renders templates in the same privileged process used for most
other client operations. During internal testing, we discovered that a malicious
task can create a symlink that can cause template rendering to read and write to
arbitrary files outside the allocation sandbox. Because the Nomad agent can be
restarted without restarting tasks, we can't simply check that the path is safe
at the time we write without encountering a time-of-check/time-of-use race.

To protect Nomad client hosts from this attack, we'll now read and write
templates in a subprocess:

* On Linux/Unix, this subprocess is sandboxed via chroot to the allocation
  directory. This requires that Nomad is running as a privileged process. A
  non-root Nomad agent will warn that it cannot sandbox the template renderer.

* On Windows, this process is sandboxed via a Windows AppContainer which has
  been granted access to only to the allocation directory. This does not require
  special privileges on Windows. (Creating symlinks in the first place can be
  prevented by running workloads as non-Administrator or
  non-ContainerAdministrator users.)

Both sandboxes cause encountered symlinks to be evaluated in the context of the
sandbox, which will result in a "file not found" or "access denied" error,
depending on the platform. This change will also require an update to
Consul-Template to allow callers to inject a custom `ReaderFunc` and
`RenderFunc`.

This design is intended as a workaround to allow us to fix this bug without
creating backwards compatibility issues for running tasks. A future version of
Nomad may introduce a read-only mount specifically for templates and artifacts
so that tasks cannot write into the same location that the Nomad agent is.

Fixes: https://github.com/hashicorp/nomad/issues/19888
Fixes: CVE-2024-1329
2024-02-08 10:40:24 -05:00

170 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
//go:build windows
package template
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"path/filepath"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/client/allocrunner/taskrunner/template/renderer"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/subproc"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/winappcontainer"
"github.com/hashicorp/nomad/helper/winexec"
)
const ExitCodeFatal int = 13 // typically this is going to be a bug in Nomad
// createPlatformSandbox creates the AppContainer profile and sets DACLs on the
// files we want to grant access to.
func createPlatformSandbox(cfg *TaskTemplateManagerConfig) error {
if !isSandboxEnabled(cfg) {
return nil
}
thisBin := subproc.Self()
containerCfg := &winappcontainer.AppContainerConfig{
Name: cfg.TaskID,
AllowedPaths: []string{
thisBin,
filepath.Dir(cfg.TaskDir), // give access to the whole alloc working directory
},
}
if cfg.Logger == nil {
cfg.Logger = hclog.Default() // prevents panics in tests
}
err := winappcontainer.CreateAppContainer(cfg.Logger, containerCfg)
if err != nil {
// if Nomad is running as an unprivileged user, we might not be able to
// create the sandbox, but in that case we're not vulnerable to the
// attacks this is intended to prevent anyways
if errors.Is(err, winappcontainer.ErrAccessDeniedToCreateSandbox) {
cfg.Logger.Debug("could not create platform sandbox", "error", err)
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("could not create platform sandbox: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// destroyPlatformSandbox deletes the AppContainer profile.
func destroyPlatformSandbox(cfg *TaskTemplateManagerConfig) error {
if cfg.ClientConfig.TemplateConfig.DisableSandbox {
return nil
}
if cfg.Logger == nil {
cfg.Logger = hclog.Default()
}
err := winappcontainer.DeleteAppContainer(cfg.Logger, cfg.TaskID)
if err != nil {
cfg.Logger.Warn("could not destroy platform sandbox", "error", err)
}
return err
}
// renderTemplateInSandbox runs the template-render command in an AppContainer to
// prevent a task from swapping a directory between the sandbox path and the
// destination with a symlink pointing to somewhere outside the sandbox.
//
// See renderer/ subdirectory for implementation.
func renderTemplateInSandbox(cfg *sandboxConfig) (string, int, error) {
procThreadAttrs, cleanup, err := winappcontainer.CreateProcThreadAttributes(cfg.taskID)
if err != nil {
return "", ExitCodeFatal, fmt.Errorf("could not create proc attributes: %v", err)
}
defer cleanup()
// Safe to inject user input as command arguments since winexec.Command
// does not invoke a shell.
args := []string{
"template-render",
"write",
"-sandbox-path", cfg.sandboxPath,
"-dest-path", cfg.destPath,
"-perms", cfg.perms,
}
if cfg.user != "" {
args = append(args, "-user")
args = append(args, cfg.user)
}
if cfg.group != "" {
args = append(args, "-group")
args = append(args, cfg.group)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)
defer cancel()
cmd := winexec.CommandContext(ctx, cfg.thisBin, args...)
cmd.ProcThreadAttributes = procThreadAttrs
stdin, err := cmd.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
return "", 1, err
}
go func() {
defer stdin.Close()
io.Copy(stdin, bytes.NewReader(cfg.contents))
}()
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
code := cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode()
if code == renderer.ExitWouldRenderButDidnt {
err = nil // erase the "exit code 117" error
}
return string(out), code, err
}
// readTemplateFromSandbox runs the template-render command in a subprocess that
// will chroot itself to prevent a task from swapping a directory between the
// sandbox path and the source with a symlink pointing to somewhere outside
// the sandbox.
func readTemplateFromSandbox(cfg *sandboxConfig) ([]byte, []byte, int, error) {
procThreadAttrs, cleanup, err := winappcontainer.CreateProcThreadAttributes(cfg.taskID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, ExitCodeFatal, fmt.Errorf("could not create proc attributes: %v", err)
}
defer cleanup()
// Safe to inject user input as command arguments since winexec.Command
// does not invoke a shell. Also, the only user-controlled argument here is
// the source path which we've already verified is at least a valid path in
// the caller.
args := []string{
"template-render",
"read",
"-sandbox-path", cfg.sandboxPath,
"-source-path", cfg.sourcePath,
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 60*time.Second)
defer cancel()
cmd := winexec.CommandContext(ctx, cfg.thisBin, args...)
cmd.ProcThreadAttributes = procThreadAttrs
var outb, errb bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout = &outb
cmd.Stderr = &errb
err = cmd.Run()
stdout := outb.Bytes()
stderr := errb.Bytes()
return stdout, stderr, cmd.ProcessState.ExitCode(), err
}