upgrade guide documentation

This commit is contained in:
Tim Gross
2020-10-20 11:18:17 -04:00
parent dc451b324f
commit 19b1ca9b4f

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@@ -89,6 +89,24 @@ the time of the upgrade for each node will ensure Connect workloads are properly
rescheduled onto nodes in such a way that the Nomad Clients, Consul agents, and
Envoy sidecar tasks maintain compatibility with one another.
## Nomad 0.12.6
### Artifact and Template Paths
Nomad 0.12.6 includes security fixes for privilege escalation vulnerabilities
in handling of job `template` and `artifact` stanzas:
- The `template.source` and `template.destination` fields are now protected by
the file sandbox introduced in 0.9.6. These paths are now restricted to fall
inside the task directory by default. An operator can opt-out of this
protection with the
[`template.disable_file_sandbox`](/docs/configuration/client#template-parameters)
field in the client configuration.
- The paths for `template.source`, `template.destination`, and
`artifact.destination` are validated on job submission to ensure the paths
do not escape the file sandbox. It was possible to use interpolation to
bypass this validation. The client now interpolates the paths before
checking if they are in the file sandbox.
## Nomad 0.12.0
@@ -164,6 +182,25 @@ plugin "qemu" {
}
```
## Nomad 0.11.5
### Artifact and Template Paths
Nomad 0.11.5 includes backported security fixes for privilege escalation
vulnerabilities in handling of job `template` and `artifact` stanzas:
- The `template.source` and `template.destination` fields are now protected by
the file sandbox introduced in 0.9.6. These paths are now restricted to fall
inside the task directory by default. An operator can opt-out of this
protection with the
[`template.disable_file_sandbox`](/docs/configuration/client#template-parameters)
field in the client configuration.
- The paths for `template.source`, `template.destination`, and
`artifact.destination` are validated on job submission to ensure the paths
do not escape the file sandbox. It was possible to use interpolation to
bypass this validation. The client now interpolates the paths before
checking if they are in the file sandbox.
## Nomad 0.11.3
Nomad 0.11.3 fixes a critical bug causing the nomad agent to become
@@ -219,6 +256,25 @@ it will not be maintained as `rkt` is [no longer being developed
upstream](https://github.com/rkt/rkt). We encourage all `rkt` users to find a
new task driver as soon as possible.
## Nomad 0.10.6
### Artifact and Template Paths
Nomad 0.10.6 includes backported security fixes for privilege escalation
vulnerabilities in handling of job `template` and `artifact` stanzas:
- The `template.source` and `template.destination` fields are now protected by
the file sandbox introduced in 0.9.6. These paths are now restricted to fall
inside the task directory by default. An operator can opt-out of this
protection with the
[`template.disable_file_sandbox`](/docs/configuration/client#template-parameters)
field in the client configuration.
- The paths for `template.source`, `template.destination`, and
`artifact.destination` are validated on job submission to ensure the paths
do not escape the file sandbox. It was possible to use interpolation to
bypass this validation. The client now interpolates the paths before
checking if they are in the file sandbox.
## Nomad 0.10.4
### Same-Node Scheduling Penalty Removed